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When  it  becomes  publicly  known  that  products  are  associated  with  suppliers  that engage  in unsustainable
behaviors,  consumers  protest,  as Nestlé,  Zara,  and  Kimberly  Clark, among  others,  have  learned.  The  phe-
nomenon  by  which  consumers  hold  ﬁrms  responsible  for the  unsustainable  behavior  of  their  upstream
partners  suggests  the  notion  of “chain  liability.”  This  study  aims  to generate  insights  into  the  antecedents
and  consequences  of such  consumer  responsibility  attributions.  Using  data  from  four vignette-based  sur-
vey  experiments,  the  authors  ﬁnd  that  the chain  liability  effect  increases  if  an  environmental  degradation
incident  (1)  results  from supplier  behavior  rather  than  force  majeure,  (2)  results  from  a company  decisionnvironmental issues
ttribution theory
ignette-based experiments
tructural equation modeling
rather  than  the decision  of  an  individual  employee,  and  (3)  is more  severe.  Responsibility  attributions
do  not  differ  with  varying  organizational  distance  from  the  supplier,  ﬁrm  size,  strategic  importance  of
the supplied  product,  or the  existence  of  environmental  management  systems.  The chain  liability  effect
also  creates  strong  risks  for  the focal  ﬁrm;  higher  responsibility  attributions  increase  consumers’  anger
and propensity  to boycott.  Therefore,  ﬁrms  should  work  to ensure  sustainable  behavior  throughout  the
hem  supply  chain,  to protect  t
. Introduction
An accusation posted on Nestlé’s Facebook site in April 2010,
You have destroyed millions of hectares of rainforest. I will no
onger buy any Nestlé products,” is representative of hundreds
f similar posts by enraged consumers. These protests became
specially prominent when public reports revealed that the palm
il contained in many of Nestlé’s products was obtained through
nsustainable behaviors: Sinar Mas, one of Nestlé’s suppliers, cut
own vast swaths of rainforest to increase the amount of land
vailable for its palm oil production. Consumers held Nestlé respon-
ible, and this case is not unique: Kimberly Clark was  scorned
hen its tissue suppliers harvested historical woodlands, and Zara
as blamed when subcontractors used toxic chemicals to dye
pparel.
Apparently consumers do not differentiate between members
f the supply chain when it comes to unsustainable behavior.
nstead, they hold the focal ﬁrm responsible for everything that
ccurs in the supply chain, which creates a “chain liability effect.”
uch unsustainable behaviors might entail economic, social, and/or
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abine.moeller@roehampton.ac.uk (S. Moeller).
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environmental dimensions (e.g., Elkington, 2004), though for this
study, we  primarily focus on the environmental dimension, which
ultimately affects human well-being (Gao and Bansal, 2013). In
this context, unsustainable supplier behavior refers to supplier
behaviors that reduce ecological capital and harm the environment
(Andersson and Lindroth, 2001); it differs from poor performance
or supplier wrongdoing, which instead imply general deviance
from basic supply chain management objectives (e.g., cost, qual-
ity, service, ﬂexibility). Unsustainable supplier behavior instead
increases the risk of unsustainable incidents, either immediately
(e.g., contamination of water supply) or after some time (e.g.,
climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions). For exam-
ple, Chinese regulations forbid the release of toxic efﬂuents into
waterways. These regulations are frequently ignored by suppli-
ers to the clothing (e.g. Zara) and other industries who often
secretly release toxic chemicals into water systems (Greenpeace,
2009). These irresponsible acts represent unsustainable behavior.
They lead to severe negative consequences for the environment
and local inhabitants. One speciﬁc pollutant caused the death of
8000 people in four major Chinese cities which constitutes an
unsustainable incident (Economy, 2013). That is, we use “inci-
dent” to refer to a negative outcome of unsustainable behavior.
We further note that many consumers express their willing-
ness to boycott ﬁrms associated with an unsustainable incident,
with substantial economic risk (Klein and Dawar, 2004; Kovács,
2008).
2 peratio
u
s
t
t
S
F
o
c
e
a
t
2
c
2
a
a
o
Z
a
t
p
b
o
d
e
d
o
u
r
t
e
s
a
w
f
u
a
t
c
m
t
r
s
e
d
a
b
i82 J. Hartmann, S. Moeller / Journal of O
Despite such impacts and their relevance, we still lack a clear
nderstanding of the underlying causal inferences by which con-
umers attribute responsibility for unsustainable supplier behavior
o a focal ﬁrm (i.e., chain liability). Literature on supply chain sus-
ainability offers important contributions (Carter and Rogers, 2008;
euring and Mueller, 2008) but also suffers some persistent gaps.
or example, supply chain literature mainly focuses on the beneﬁts
f sustainability, rather than the threats associated with insufﬁ-
ient efforts (e.g., Carter, 2000; Jayaraman et al., 2005; Melnyk
t al., 2003). In investigating supply chain structures, prior research
ddresses direct supplier relationships, with only marginal atten-
ion devoted to multitier supply chains (Kovács, 2008; Mena et al.,
013). Finally, existing studies outline ways to ensure supplier
ompliance with expectations and standards (Delmas and Montiel,
009; Jiang, 2009), to encourage suppliers to become more sustain-
ble (Gavronski et al., 2011; Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Vachon
nd Klassen, 2008), and to determine the effects of such initiatives
n performance (Bai and Sarkis, 2010; Carter and Jennings, 2004;
hu and Sarkis, 2004), but they ignore the effect of the lack of such
ctivities.
Operations and supply chain literature naturally pays less atten-
ion to consumers’ perceptions, though some studies include this
erspective, focusing on the consequences of responsibility attri-
utions rather than their determinants. We  thus ﬁnd investigations
f threats to consumer safety emanating from supplier wrong-
oing and their implications (e.g., Hora et al., 2011; Marucheck
t al., 2011). Marketing studies also attempt to explicate the
eterminants of responsibility attribution by noting how a lack
f sustainability can be manifest in defective or dangerous prod-
cts (Gao et al., 2012; Klein and Dawar, 2004; Laufer et al., 2005),
ather than in the production process. Despite these valuable con-
ributions, to the best of our knowledge, no investigations include
nvironmental dimensions of sustainability concerns in multitier
upply chains, in which consumers’ expectations determine their
ttributions and deﬁne their reactions.
Accordingly, this study seeks to make three contributions. First,
e aim to determine if consumers hold focal ﬁrms responsible
or the ecologically unsustainable behavior of their suppliers in
pstream, multitier supply chains, or if this effect is anecdotal. With
 vignette-based study, we obtain evidence that consumers blame
he focal ﬁrm for unsustainable supplier behavior and thereby
larify consumers’ expectations of environmental standards in a
ultitier supply chain. Second, we investigate contextual factors
hat might increase or decrease such responsibility attributions,
elated to the incident, the relationship with the supplier, and the
tructure of the supply chain. By considering the relative inﬂu-
nces of eight factors, we offer critical insights for supply chain
ecision makers, who must prioritize and promote targeted actions
nd engagement. Third, we shed light on consumers’ emotional and
ehavioral reactions to responsibility attributions, to offer insights
nto the potential market risks associated with an unsustainable
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Fig. 1. Attribution process according to Weins Management 32 (2014) 281–294
incident. That is, we  examine unsustainability in supply chains by
acknowledging consumer perceptions and reactions as a starting
point for a deﬁnition of appropriate supply chain strategies.
In the next section, we introduce attribution theory as our
theoretical basis and deﬁne the key constructs that lead to our
hypothesis development. In Section 3, we describe the research
settings, experiments, and data, before presenting the ﬁndings in
Section 4. We  conclude with discussions of our ﬁndings and their
implications.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Attribution theory
Attribution theory (AT) views individuals as rational informa-
tion processors who try to make sense of the world by attributing
causes to incidents. Faced with an incident, a person seeks to under-
stand what caused it and determine who  is responsible (Fincham
and Jaspers, 1980; Hamilton, 1978). According to AT, responsibility
attributions vary on several dimensions. The locus of causality dif-
ferentiates situational factors and abilities; controllability refers to
the degree of volitional control an offender has over the outcome,
representing the degree of direct inﬂuence on the cause. Stability
is the degree to which the cause remains constant over time and
indicates what to expect from the offender in future, in similar cir-
cumstances (Weiner, 1986, 1995). Furthermore, an extension of AT
includes incident severity, such that people likely attribute more
responsibility for more severe incidents (e.g., Tennen and Afﬂeck,
1990). Therefore, consumers should assign more responsibility if a
cause of an incident is (a) internal, (b) controllable, (c) stable, and
(d) more severe.
Responsibility attributions are inherently tied to emotional and
behavioral reactions (Weiner, 1986, 1995). For example, poverty
attributions that focus beyond the person (e.g., impoverished due
to a natural disaster) tend to induce sympathy as an emotional
reaction and assistance as a behavioral reaction. Attributions that
address the person’s own actions (e.g., gambling) instead likely
lead to negative emotions and behavioral reactions (e.g., refusing
to help; Weiner, 1986, 1995), as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In operations management literature, AT primarily has served
to explicate the social, behavioral, and emotional aspects of opera-
tional decision making (Bendoly et al., 2006; Urda and Loch, 2013),
including wait perceptions and their consequences (Seawright and
Sampson, 2007), the effects of customer interactions on purchas-
ing behaviors in self-service situations (Li et al., 2013), the inﬂuence
of fairness perceptions on the degree of cooperation for technology
entrepreneurship (van Burg and van Oorschot, 2013), and the social,
technological, or personal factors that lead to (un)safe work behav-
iors (Brown et al., 2000; DeJoy, 1994). Eckerd et al. (2013) use AT
to understand how breaches of psychological contracts affect work
behaviors and attitudinal perceptions, in the context of two  supply
Emotional 
Reaction
(e.g. anger)
Behavioral
Reaction
(e.g.  boy cotting)
ResponseReaction
ner’s (1986, 1995) attribution theory.
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hain partners. In contrast, most operations management research
pplies AT at the individual level. With this study, we extend the
pplication of AT to incidents that occur in multitier supply chains,
s perceived by individual consumers, to investigate sustainability
n supply chains.
Attribution theory also can shed light on consumer percep-
ions of corporate responsibility. Skarmeas and Leonidou (2013)
nd that attributions of egoistic- and stakeholder-driven motives
licit consumer skepticism; values-driven attributions inhibit such
kepticism. In turn, skepticism lowers retailer equity, decreases
esistance to negative information about the retailer, and stimu-
ates unfavorable word of mouth. Consumers who instead perceive
esponsible actions as sincere and in line with the overall company
trategy reward companies by choosing their products over com-
etitors’ (Becker-Olsen et al., 2006; Ellen et al., 2006; Yoon et al.,
006. Thus, consumers appear to reward sustainable (responsible)
rm behavior; we also seek to understand how consumers punish
nsustainable behaviors.
In developed economies, consumers push ﬁrms to monitor and
lose gaps in their sustainability performance across supply chains
Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Parmigiani et al., 2011), holding them
esponsible for the conditions in which the products they offer
ere manufactured (Phillips and Caldwell, 2005). Responsibility
s strongly conferred when the ﬁrm can make independent deci-
ions and control and inﬂuence outcomes in the supply chain (New,
004; Parmigiani et al., 2011). Such authority and ability depend on
ifferent factors, as do consumers’ responsibility attributions.
.2. Locus of causality
The locus of causality dimension suggests that if the cause of an
ncident is a situational factor, an observer will attribute respon-
ibility for its outcome to situational and contextual factors (e.g.,
ature) rather than speciﬁc actors (e.g., the company) (Folkes, 1984;
lein and Dawar, 2004). The cause of the incident is external-
zed (Gao et al., 2012), and less responsibility accrues to the ﬁrm
Weiner, 1986, 1995). Force majeure is a case in point: If toxic chem-
cals get released into the air because of sloppy security systems
pplied during manufacturing, observers attribute responsibility
o the ﬁrm. If the cause of this release instead is an earthquake,
hich damaged the ﬁrm’s security systems in unforeseeable ways,
hey likely attribute responsibility to situational factors. That is,
n unsustainable incident at a supplier’s site caused by situational
actors, as opposed to internal ones, leads consumers to assign less
esponsibility to the focal ﬁrm.
1. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm for
nsustainable supplier behavior when the cause is company failure
ather than force majeure.
.3. Controllability
The controllability dimension implies that responsibility attri-
utions increase as controllability intensiﬁes (Weiner, 1986, 1995),
hich might result from the structure of the supply chain (H2 and
3) or the nature of the relationship between a focal ﬁrm and its
uppliers (H4 and H5). In terms of supply chain structure, control in
upply chains derives from the inﬂuence that a ﬁrm has over spe-
iﬁc problems, decisions, or outcomes (New, 2004). This sphere of
ontrol can span several levels in the supply chain. The internal level
esignates the ﬁrm’s own operations, under the direct and strong
ontrol of managers (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Parmigiani et al.,
011). For example, a ﬁrm can decide whether to implement
n environmental management system (EMS). At other tiers, the
ocal ﬁrm may  have comparatively less control; it can formulate
nd seek to impose expectations about supplier environmentalns Management 32 (2014) 281–294 283
performance, but it must draw on additional monitoring and col-
laboration systems to check for compliance (Klassen and Vereecke,
2012). Internal operations are more controllable, so they should
lead to higher responsibility attributions.
H2. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm for
unsustainable supplier behavior when the incident occurs at the
focal ﬁrm’s internal manufacturing sites rather than external sup-
pliers’ manufacturing sites.
Furthermore, with regard to external supply chain partners,
organizational distance—or the number of tiers separating a focal
ﬁrm and a speciﬁc supplier, which deﬁnes the length of the supply
chain (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010)—is a critical consideration.
Operations management literature connects organizational dis-
tance to a supplier’s use of socially responsible behaviors. For
example, Awaysheh and Klassen (2010) argue that with greater dis-
tance, ﬁrms face increased complexity and transaction costs when
interacting with suppliers, leading them to employ more monitor-
ing and auditing systems to mitigate information and transparency
problems. Greater organizational distance also increases suppli-
ers’ use of worker safety measures, codes of conduct, and social
audits, likely because they have more difﬁculty obtaining correct
and timely information about the manufacturing conditions main-
tained by more distant, upstream supply chain partners.
For example, tier 1 suppliers have a direct, contractual rela-
tionship with the focal ﬁrm, so it can include sustainability in its
contractual arrangements, engage in continuous decision making
(Wu  and Pagell, 2011), and undertake joint product development
(e.g., Matos and Hall, 2007). The focal ﬁrm also can specify cer-
tain control mechanisms to enforce compliance with sustainability
regulations and expectations (Jiang, 2009). Coordination with tier
2 suppliers is more complex and difﬁcult, because they have no
direct contractual relationship. The focal ﬁrm might request infor-
mation about its tier 2 suppliers from its tier 1 supplier, which
maintains contractual relationships with both sides. Information
about tier 3 suppliers is nearly impossible to obtain. That is, longer
supply chains are more complex and difﬁcult to manage (Awaysheh
and Klassen, 2010), because transparency diminishes across multi-
ple tiers (Roth et al., 2008). Consumers should acknowledge that a
more distant supplier is less controllable, in which case they might
attribute less responsibility to the focal ﬁrm.
H3. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm
for unsustainable supplier behavior when organizational distance
between the focal ﬁrm and the supplier is lower.
Controllability also is inﬂuenced by variations in the relation-
ship between the focal ﬁrm and the unsustainable supplier; we
concentrate on two relational factors, namely, ﬁrm size and resource
criticality. Larger focal ﬁrms have more power to inﬂuence supplier
behavior, because they have more opportunity to allocate business
to suppliers (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Maloni and Benton,
2000). They also are more likely to apply industry norms strin-
gently and extend them idiosyncratically to suppliers (Parmigiani
et al., 2011). Furthermore, large ﬁrms may  be in a better position
to provide ﬁnancial, human, and technological resources to help
the supplier improve its environmental performance (Melnyk et al.,
2003). Finally, large companies are more prone to scrutiny by con-
sumers and other stakeholders (Parmigiani et al., 2011), such that
they seek to transfer some of this pressure upstream. We thus pre-
dict that consumers attribute more responsibility to larger ﬁrms,
because they perceive these ﬁrms have more opportunity to control
the behavior of their supply chain partners.
H4. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm for
unsustainable supplier behavior when the focal ﬁrm is larger.
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Firms that rely on outside supplies for important products and
ervices likely develop capabilities to increase their controllabil-
ty over and the transparency of upstream partners (Roth et al.,
008). These capabilities should increase the ﬁrm’s understanding
f its supplier’s manufacturing science, technology, and conditions
Parmigiani et al., 2011). Such capabilities are costly though, so the
ocal ﬁrm is more likely to invest in developing them with strate-
ically relevant supplies, rather than less strategically relevant
nes. Buyer–supplier collaboration is most common in focused,
ong-term, strategic relationships (Lee and Klassen, 2008). Vachon
nd Klassen (2006) argue that focused collaboration with strategic
uppliers encourages the joint improvement of the supply chain’s
nvironmental performance. Buying ﬁrms do not invest equally
n ﬁnancial, human, or other resources to attain similar levels of
ransparency and controllability over suppliers for less strategically
elevant aspects (e.g., Rao, 2005). From a supply chain perspective,
e posit that focal ﬁrms have more transparency and control over
uppliers that deliver strategically important products and services,
nd we anticipate that consumers reﬂect this coherence in their
xpectations. Thus, the chain liability effect should be lower if the
art delivered by an unsustainable supplier is of less importance
or creating the end product.
5. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm for
nsustainable supplier behavior when the strategic importance of
he product is greater.
.4. Stability
We  use the stability dimension of AT to predict responsibility
ttributions according to whether an individual or the company
as caused the incident (H6) and whether the company has EMS
n place (H7). First, chain liability may  be a function of company
ersus individual failures. If the cause of the incident is the entire
rm, rather than an employee within it, that cause appears stable, in
hat it reﬂects a common behavior in the company. A perception of
reater stability should increase the chain liability effect. However,
f the behavior of a single individual is the cause of the unsustain-
ble incident, this behavior represents an exception rather than the
ule, is unstable, and should provoke less responsibility attribution
o the ﬁrm.
6. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm
or unsustainable supplier behavior when the supplier company,
ather than an individual actor within the company, caused the
ncident.
Second, regardless of supply chain complexity, consumers likely
xpect the focal ﬁrm to account for environmental conditions
pstream during its purchasing decisions (Gao et al., 2012). With
MS, ﬁrms implement ﬁnancial, human, technological, and orga-
izational resources and routines to improve their environmental
erformance, either internally (Gavronski et al., 2011) or externally
Foerstl et al., 2010; Reuter et al., 2010). A ﬁrm with a sophisticated
MS is in a better position to transfer similar routines to suppli-
rs, such as by auditing and assessing the supplier’s environmental
erformance (Reuter et al., 2010) or supporting its efforts to gain
nvironmental certiﬁcation (Zhu et al., 2012). Such activities signal
hat the ﬁrm cares for the preservation of the natural environment
nd seeks to ensure sustainability across its entire supply chain; if
t suffers an unsustainable incident, consumers thus might inter-
ret the event as misfortune or bad luck (i.e., unstable). If the focal
rm instead has no EMS, it demonstrates no effort to prevent envi-
onmental damage, so an unsustainable incident that occurs at a
upply chain partner’s site does not appear unique. Instead, con-
umers likely believe that the probability of a similar incident inns Management 32 (2014) 281–294
the future is high (i.e., stable), so they assign more responsibility to
the focal ﬁrm.
H7. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm
for unsustainable supplier behavior when it has no environmental
management system in place.
2.5. Severity
Finally, severity refers to the extent of damage caused,
which may range from minor air emissions to vast oil spills
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001). Toxic emissions put people’s health at risk
and seem more severe than overly high water usage, for exam-
ple. The perceived severity of a negative incident is important for
determining responsibility attributions, because a severe incident
tends to be more vivid and salient, causing greater rumination,
whereas less severe incidents are easier to forgive (Crossley,
2009; McCullough et al., 1997). Phares and Wilson (1972) use
an experimental study to show that responsibility attributions
signiﬁcantly increase with the severity of the outcome in car acci-
dents. Kouabenan et al. (2001) ﬁnd empirical evidence that people
assign more responsibility to supervisors for work-related acci-
dents with more severe consequences. Operations management
literature addresses incidents with negative product attributes that
ultimately lead to product recalls (e.g., Hora et al., 2011; Marucheck
et al., 2011), such as the use of lead paint in Mattel toys (Tang,
2008). Similarly, the chain liability effect should be stronger for
more severe outcomes of unsustainable supplier behavior.
H8. Consumers attribute more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm for
unsustainable supplier behavior when the outcomes of this behav-
ior are more severe.
2.6. Consequences of responsibility attribution
Operations and supply chain management literature empha-
sizes the notions of operational or supply chain risk (Sodhi et al.,
2012), with the recognition that globalization, concentration on
core competencies, and outsourcing to specialized suppliers can
expand strategic opportunities but also increase the probability
of adverse incidents in the supply chain (Hora and Klassen, 2013;
Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009). Unsustainable supplier behavior is
one such adverse incident, and multiple stakeholder groups could
hold the focal ﬁrm accountable (Parmigiani et al., 2011). Firms
caught up in scandals risk consumer boycotts that can result in
ﬁnancial losses (Fombrun et al., 2000; Zadek, 2004).
To date, operations management literature has paid relatively
limited attention to this type of risk, which stems from consumers’
perceptions of unsustainable supplier behavior. Yet negative inci-
dents have greater impacts than positive ones (Sen and Battacharya,
2001). Research in marketing has shown that individual reactions
to negative incidents are both emotional and behavioral in nature,
such that consumers express anger toward an organization they
hold accountable (Bell et al., 1994; Struthers et al., 2004, 2005;
Taylor, 1994). Emotions lead to coping behaviors (Bagozzi et al.,
1999), including boycotting (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). Thus,
environmental and social issues can inﬂuence purchase decisions
(Klein et al., 2004).
According to AT, responsibility assignments inﬂuence both emo-
tional and behavioral reactions (Weiner, 1986, 1995). The more
responsibility assigned for an incident, the stronger the resulting
emotional and behavioral reactions (Fincham and Jaspers, 1980;
Shaver, 1985). With this research, we seek to understand the con-
sequences of a negative incident (unsustainable supplier behavior)
and concentrate on negative emotional and behavioral reactions
that likely follow from such an incident. Anger is a common emo-
tional outcome of responsibility attributions for a negative incident
J. Hartmann, S. Moeller / Journal of Operations Management 32 (2014) 281–294 285
Table  1
Links between theory, constructs, hypothesis and experiments.
Attribution theory dimension Manipulated constructs Hypothesis Experiment
Locus of causality Force majeure vs. company failure H1 Klebﬁx
Controllability Internal vs. external supplier (structure of the supply chain) H2 Visuallife
Organizational distance (structure of the supply chain) H3 Dressup
Firm size (type of relationship) H4 Klebﬁx
Product importance (type of relationship) H5 Fastcar
Stability Company vs. individual H6 Fastcar
Environmental management system H7 Visuallife
Severity Degree of severity (toxicity) H8 Visuallife
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Weiner, 1986, 1995). For example, when consumers attribute
esponsibility for service delays to the service provider and not an
xternal cause, they feel more anger toward the service provider
Taylor, 1994). In organizational behavior literature, higher respon-
ibility attributions for irresponsible ﬁrm behavior are associated
ith more anger perceived by employees (Struthers et al., 2004,
005). It thus seems likely that
9. Higher responsibility attributions to the focal ﬁrm for unsus-
ainable supplier behavior lead to higher levels of anger among
onsumers.
In line with prior literature, we expect emotion to amplify
orresponding behavioral reactions; the connection between emo-
ions and behavior is often higher than that between attitudes and
ehavior (Bagozzi et al., 1999). If more responsibility results in
ore negative feelings of anger, the likelihood of negative behav-
oral reactions also increases. Consumer research conﬁrms a link
etween negative feelings and boycotting; for example, Klein et al.
2004) ﬁnd that negative emotions offer a powerful predictor of
oycott participation. However, boycott participation depends on
ther related factors, such as the costs of participation and whether
onsumers perceive that their boycotting behavior makes a differ-
nce (Klein et al., 2004). Furthermore, consumers who  participate
n boycotts mainly are motivated by a desire to vent their anger
nd punish the ﬁrm (Braunsberger and Buckler, 2011). Therefore,
e predict a positive impact of emotional (anger) on behavioral
boycotts) reactions, in response to responsibility attributions.
10. Higher levels of anger perceived by consumers lead to more
oycotting behavior among consumers.
. Methods
To test these hypotheses, we used four vignette-based experi-
ents with three samples, employing survey methods (Field and
ole, 2003). Different vignettes described a buying ﬁrm engaged in
 supply chain interaction with one or more supplying ﬁrms. Each
ignette reported an incident of environmental pollution at one of
he supplying ﬁrms’ sites, resulting from its unsustainable behav-
or. After reading the vignettes, participants responded to a series
f survey items. Table 1 summarizes the AT dimensions, constructs,
ypotheses, and corresponding experiments.
.1. Development and pretesting of vignettes
The vignettes were carefully constructed to manipulate the vari-
bles of interest: Force majeure versus company failure (H1) was
anipulated as a technical error, resulting from a lightning stroke
r an error in technical modulation. In the ﬁrm internal versus
upplier external manufacturing site distinction (H2), the envi-
onmental incident occurred either at a ﬁrm site or one of theH9 All
H10 All
ﬁrm’s suppliers’ sites. The organizational distance (H3) manipula-
tion used a supply chain with one, two, or three tiers. Focal ﬁrm size
(H4) was  manipulated as either a small ﬁrm with 70 employees or a
large ﬁrm with 15,200 employees. A supplier delivering a strategic
part (H5) delivered material for seats in an automotive vehicle; a
supplier with a less strategic part offered leather for a decorative
strip. For the supplier as an institutional versus individual actor
(H6), we  indicated that either the company or an employee used
toxic materials in manufacturing processes. Environmental man-
agement systems (H7) were described according to ﬁrm attributes,
such as environmental values and award-winning EMS  as opposed
to problems in environmental management, resulting in repeated
ﬁnes. Incident severity (H8) was either comparatively low (dissi-
pation of water) or high (wrong treatment of waste, resulting in
human injury). In total, we created four vignettes, designated by
hypothetical names: Klebﬁx (2 × 2), Dressup (3), Fastcar (2 × 2), and
Visuallife (2 × 2 × 2), as we  detail in Table 2.
Wason et al. (2002) recommend assessing and adjusting
vignettes for internal consistency and plausibility. Therefore, we
pretested them with several student samples to ensure that the
manipulations worked as intended, participants understood the
scenarios, and respondents believed the scenarios to be consis-
tent. Students were randomly assigned to a vignette and asked
to respond to the manipulation check items. For example, in the
manipulation check for organizational distance, students indi-
cated the number of organizations involved in the supply chain
(two, three, or four). The ﬁrst pretest conﬁrmed that most of the
manipulations worked, as evidenced by the signiﬁcant differences
in responses to the manipulation checks. However, two initial
vignettes (organizational distance and force majeure versus com-
pany failure) showed no signiﬁcant differences, so we modiﬁed
them and subjected them to a second pretest; this time, signiﬁcant
differences arose for the manipulation checks.
In the pretest, students also rated the degree of realism (1 = “not
at all realistic” to 5 = “very realistic”) of three of the four vignettes.
The means for this item ranged between 3.6 and 3.8, suggesting that
the vignettes appeared realistic. Finally, to increase the validity of
the vignettes, we obtained feedback from three researchers with
substantial expertise in experimental research. Their suggestions
helped us reﬁne the wording of some vignettes.
3.2. Participants
After the pretests, we contracted with a German-based panel
provider to collect data from three different, independent samples,
each representative of the German population. The ﬁrst sample,
with 250 participants, considered the Klebﬁx vignette. A second
sample, with 284 participants, read both the DressUp and the
Fastcar vignettes. To build internal validity and control for any
sequence effects, participants completed a distractor task between
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Table  2
Description of the vignettes.
Vignette 1 “Klebﬁx” (2 × 2, between-subjects manipulation)
No general introduction; four possible experimental manipulations: aa, ab, ba, bb
Controllability:  Focal ﬁrm size (H4) aa. Small focal ﬁrm ab. Large focal ﬁrm
Klebﬁx is a small company with 70 employees. Klebﬁx
produces adhesives and therefore buys different
chemicals. One of the chemical suppliers is Fine
Chemicals.
Klebﬁx is a large company with 15,200 employees.
Klebﬁx produces adhesives and therefore buys
different chemicals. One of the chemical suppliers is
Fine Chemicals.
Locus  of causality: Force majeure vs. company
failure (H1)
ba. Force majeure bb. Company failure
Recently, it has become publicly known that an
accident at Fine Chemicals caused acid waste water to
leak into the groundwater. This accident was  caused
by  force majeure: An engine had exploded due to a
severe lightning strike that hit the facility and its
electric systems.
Recently, it has become publicly known that an
accident at Fine Chemicals caused acid waste water to
leak into the groundwater. This accident was caused
by company failure: An engine had exploded due to an
inaccurate system setting.
Vignette 2 “Dressup” (3-level, between-subjects manipulation)
General introduction (identical across
Vignette 2 scenarios)
Environmental Scandal in Asia! A
production site of the company Super
Dye located on the shores of a lake in
Asia, which dyes textiles with toxic
devices, inappropriately disposed of its
efﬂuents, causing the contamination of
the lake. All the plants and animals in
the lake were killed off; it will take
decades for the lake to recover. Among
other purposes, dyed textiles from
Super Dye are used for jeans
production for the label Dressup.
Dressup is an upcoming German
fashion label, and the company’s
success is based on the sales of
particularly well-ﬁtting, fashionable
jeans. Every season, Dressup develops
new designs and colours for jeans,
which are then produced by different
suppliers.
Controllability: Organizational distance (H3) a. Two-tier supply chain b. Three-tier supply chain c. Four-tier supply chain
Therefore, Dressup assigns various
producers to dye and sew its jeans.
The aforementioned Super Dye,
which discharged toxic efﬂuents
into the lake, happened to be one of
these producers. Thus, Dressup has
a direct contractual relationship
with Super Dye. In total there are
two companies involved in this
process: Dressup and Super Dye.
Therefore, Dressup authorizes the
intermediary Fashion Retail to
search for appropriate suppliers.
Fashion Retail assigns various
producers to dye and sew the
jeans. The aforementioned Super
Dye, which discharged toxic
efﬂuents into the sea, happened to
be one of these producers. Thus,
Dressup has no direct supply chain
relationship with Super Dye. In
total there are three companies
involved in this process: Dressup,
Fashion Retail, and Super Dye.
Therefore, Dressup authorizes the
intermediary Fashion Retail to
search for appropriate suppliers.
Fashion Retail assigns various
producers to dye and sew the
jeans. In the name of Dressup,
Fashion retail assigned the
producer Bluejeans to sew the
jeans. Bluejeans in turn bought
dyed textiles from suppliers,
including the aforementioned
Super Dye, which discharged toxic
efﬂuents into the sea. Dressup has
no  direct contractual relationship
with Super Dye. In total there are
four companies involved in this
process: Dressup, Fashion Retail,
Bluejeans, and Super Dye.
Vignette 3 “Fastcar” (2 × 2 between-subjects manipulation)
General introduction (identical across
Vignette 3 scenarios)
Fastcar produces automotive vehicles and buys, among other products, leather for vehicle manufacturing.
Controllability: Product importance (H5) aa. High product importance for end product ab. Low product importance for end product
Leather is used for the seats inside the cars.
The leather is therefore much more important
than components bought from other suppliers.
Leather is used for a decorative strip inside the
cars. The leather is therefore much less
important than components bought from other
suppliers.
Stability: company vs. individual (H6) ba. Company bb. Individual
The company Luxury Leather supplies Fastcar
with leather. Recently, it became publicly
known that Luxury Leather used chromic acids
for leather tanning. Chromic acid is highly toxic
and carcinogenic and is therefore forbidden.
The company Luxury Leather supplies Fastcar
with leather. Recently, it became publicly
known that the department head of the
tanning department of Luxury Leather used
chromic acids for leather tanning. Chromic acid
is highly toxic and carcinogenic and is
therefore forbidden.
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Table  2 (Continued)
Vignette 4 “Visuallife” (2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects manipulation)
General introduction (identical across all
Vignette 4 scenarios)
Visuallife is a company that produces monitors and displays for televisions, laptops, and mobile phones
Stability: Environmental Mgt. System (H7) aa. EMS ab. Lack of EMS
Visuallife is strongly engaged in
environmental preservation. Since its
inception, the company had built up a
comprehensive environmental
management system and received
several awards for it.
In the past, Visuallife frequently had
problems with environmental
regulations that it did not comply with.
Because of this, Visuallife had to pay
penalties on several occasions.
Controllability: Internal versus external (H2) ba. Focal ﬁrm internal manufacturing bb. Focal ﬁrm external manufacturing
For  economic reasons Visuallife moved
the production of monitors to Taiwan a
couple of months ago. Therefore, the
company built its own  facility in
Taiwan.
For economic reasons Visuallife moved
the production of monitors to a
supplier in Taiwan a couple of months
ago. It no longer produces monitors at
its own sites.
Severity: Incident severity (H8) ca. High severity cb. Low severity
Recently, it has become publicly
known that toxic wastes were not
discharged appropriately at the
supplier’s facility in Taiwan.
Employees who  came in contact with
the toxic materials suffered severe
impai
ives.
Recently, it has become publicly
known that water was used
irresponsibly in the production facility
in Taiwan. Every day, on average
approximately 1000 L more water are
used for the cooling machines than at a
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the rest of their l
he two vignettes (Field and Hole, 2003). Finally, the Visuallife sam-
le included 623 participants. In all cases, participants received a
mall ﬁnancial reward (3 Euros) for participating in the study from
he panel provider. We  report the distribution of the participants
y gender, age, and educational background in Table 3.
.3. Measures
After reading a scenario, participants responded to a series
f questions to measure their responsibility attributions, anger,
nd boycotting intentions. All constructs in this questionnaire
ere measured with existing, seven-point Likert scales (1 = “not
t all,” 7 = “entirely”), as we show in Appendix 1. As presented in
able 4, responsibility attribution was measured with three items
rom Struthers et al. (2005), such that participants rated the extent
o which they thought the focal ﬁrm was “responsible” and acted
carelessly” or “thoughtlessly.” Three items appeared in the anger
easure (Crossley, 2009). Participants indicated the probability
hat customers of the focal ﬁrm would feel “angry,” “hostile,” and
offended.” We measured boycotting with three items from Fragale
t al. (2009) and Struthers et al. (2005). Speciﬁcally, we asked par-
icipants how likely consumers would be to “harm [the focal ﬁrm],”
do something to make [the focal ﬁrm] pay,” or “boycott [the focal
able 3
ample characteristics.
Klebﬁx 
Gender
Female 53.2% 
Age
18–24  14.8% 
25–34  16.4% 
35–44  23.6% 
45–54  25.2% 
55–65  20.0% 
Education
Certiﬁcate of secondary education (9 years) 31.6% 
Certiﬁcate of secondary education (10 years) 40.4% 
University entrance certiﬁcate 12.4% 
Post  graduate certiﬁcate 15.6% 
Sample size 250 r their health for comparable facility in Germany.
ﬁrm].” Composite reliability values ranged between .743 and .954,
all above the recommended threshold of .7 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).
The average variances extracted also were above the recommended
value of .5, in support of scale consistency (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).
We  next analyzed the items using a conﬁrmatory factor analysis
(CFA) in Mplus to assess the scale reliability and validity of the over-
all measurement scheme (Hair et al., 2006). The data were slightly
positively skewed, so we used a maximum likelihood (MLM)  esti-
mator, which is more robust for non-normally distributed data. As
Table 4 shows, the model ﬁt was acceptable for most models but
only mediocre for Dressup, for which the root mean square error
of approximation (RMSEA) fell just below the recommended rejec-
tion value of .1 (Brown, 2006). Yet the conﬁrmatory ﬁt index (CFI)
and Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) values indicated acceptable ﬁt for
all the models (Brown, 2006). Across these ﬁt indices for all four
models, the CFA results supported the validity and reliability of our
measurement instrument.
As in the pretest, participants answered manipulation checks
items to verify that they perceived the experimental manipulations
as intended (Field and Hole, 2003). For the Visuallife vignettes, par-
ticipants responded to these items at the end of the questionnaire.
Regarding the internal versus external supplier site manipula-
tion, participants indicated whether they believed the incident
Dressup/Fastcar Visuallife
49.3% 50.4%
14.8% 11.7%
19.4% 18.1%
25.4% 22.2%
21.1% 27.0%
19.0% 21.0%
24.6% 26.6%
40.8% 39.3%
14.4% 16.2%
20.1% 17.8%
284 623
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Table  4
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis results.
Item/construct Klebﬁx Dressup Fastcar Visuallife
Responsibility attribution
Responsible (loading) .778* .580* .702* .426*
Careless (loading) .945* .833* .921* .819*
Thoughtless (loading) .856* .911* .931* .821*
CR .896 .826 .892 .743
AVE  .866 .752 .860 .613
˛  .882 .805 .871 .717
Anger
Angry  (loading) .891* .891* .890* .913*
Hostile (loading) .946* .965* .950* .941*
Offended (loading) .964* .889* .961* .931*
CR .954 .940 .954 .949
AVE  .947 .929 .947 .942
˛  .953 .943 .954 .950
Boycotting
Harm (loading) .698* .801* .771* .776*
Make pay (loading) .746* .824* .834* .803*
Boycott (loading) .814* .560* .663* .795*
CR .797 .778 .802 .834
AVE  .692 .662 .702 .759
˛  .792 .739 .774 .833
Goodness of ﬁt
RMSEA .075 .094 .086 .067
CFI  .975 .954 .961 .977
TLI  .962 .931 .941 .966
SRMR  .047 .092 .082 .038
Notes: n(Klebﬁx) = 250; n(DressUp) = 284; n(FastCar) = 284; n(VisualLife) = 623. The conﬁrmatory factor analyses used a MLM estimator. CR = construct reliability. AVE = average variance
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* p < .001.
appened at the focal ﬁrm’s own manufacturing site, using a seven-
oint scale (1 = “applies not at all,” 7 = “applies entirely”). Their
esponses were signiﬁcantly lower for the vignettes that described
n incident happening at a supplier’s site than for those in which the
ncident was described as having happened at a manufacturing site
wned by the focal ﬁrm (Mfocal ﬁrm = 4.28; Msupplier = 3.20, p = .002).
imilarly, respondents’ EMS  perceptions were signiﬁcantly differ-
nt across conditions (Mhigh = 3.25; Mlow = 2.89, p = .003), as were
heir perceptions of incident severity (Mhigh = 5.84; Mlow = 5.15,
 = .000). For the other three vignettes (Klebﬁx, Dressup, and Fast-
ar), we applied the manipulation checks as ﬁlter questions and
peciﬁed thresholds for “correct” answers. For example, for the
rm size manipulation, participants ﬁrst read the scenario and then
ndicated, on a ﬁve-point scale, the ﬁrm’s size (1 = “very small,”
 = “very large”). Correct answers ranged from 1 to 3 for the small
anipulation (70 employees) and 3 to 5 for the large manipulation
15,200 employees). A respondent providing an incorrect answer
as asked to read the vignette again and respond to the same ques-
ion. If the response was repeatedly incorrect, the participant was
hanked and excluded from completing the rest of the question-
aire.
Because research that deals with sensitive topics, such as stated
eactions to unsustainable ﬁrm behavior, may  be susceptible to
ocial desirability bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), we implemented
wo procedures. First, we used indirect references to the opinions
f a third person, such that the items referred to (other) customers
ecoming angry or boycotting, not the respondent him- or herself.
his procedure, according to Fisher (1993), reduces social desirabil-
ty bias in surveys. Second, to check for potential social desirability,
e included two items from the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social
esirability scale.
As control measures, participants provided information about
heir age, highest level of education, and gender. They also indicated
ow important the preservation of the natural environment was for
hem. This item came from the Schwartz Value Scale (Schwartz and
ilsky, 1990), measured on a seven-point Likert scale. conﬁrmatory ﬁt index. TLI = Tucker–Lewis index. SRMR = standardized root mean
Finally, our reliance on self-reported data from single infor-
mants introduced the potential for common method bias; we
employed several techniques to control for it. First, we  used estab-
lished scales for all constructs (MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2012).
Second, we guaranteed respondents’ anonymity. Third, we  con-
ducted Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003), to
determine if a single latent factor accounted better for all manifest
items than our theoretically speciﬁed, multifactor measurement
model. The chi-square difference test, using Satorra–Bentler’s MLM
mean-adjusted estimator (Muthén and Muthén, 2013), revealed
signiﬁcantly better model ﬁt for the multifactor model. Thus,
common method bias did not appear to be a major prob-
lem.
4. Results
We  tested our hypotheses using structural equation modeling
with a robust maximum likelihood MLM  estimator (Byrne, 2012;
Muthén and Muthén, 2010). We  calculated four structural equation
models, one for each experiment, using the experimental manipu-
lations as independent variables. The results appear in Table 5.
Considering the size of the samples and the number of observed
variables, we regard the model ﬁt as acceptable: RMSEA values
were .065 (Dressup, Fastcar) or lower (Steiger, 2007); the CFI and
TLI were greater than .95; and the standardized root mean residual
was below .08 (Hair et al., 2006).
Regarding our locus of causality hypothesis, chain liability
should be lower if the cause of the unsustainable incident is
perceived as force majeure (external situational factors) rather than
a failure by the vendor (internal at focal ﬁrm). The experimen-
tal manipulation was  coded as dummy  variable (0 = force majeure,
1 = supplier failure). In support of H1, the structural path was  highly
signiﬁcant (SE = .405, p = .000), and consumers would attribute sig-
niﬁcantly more responsibility to the focal ﬁrm if the cause of the
incident was  under the control of the supplier, as opposed to force
majeure.
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Table  5
Structural equation modeling results.
Klebﬁx Dressup Fastcar Visuallife
SE  (p-value) SE (p-value) SE (p-value) SE (p-value)
Experimental manipulations (antecedents)
Locus of control
H1: Force majeure vs. supplier failure .405 (.000)
Controllability (structure)
H2: Focal ﬁrm (internal) vs. supply chain (external) .007 (.868)
H3: Organizational distance −.027 (.662)
Controllability (relation between buyer and supplier)
H4: Focal ﬁrm size .057 (.333)
H5: Importance of supplied part −.032 (.591)
Stability
H6: Company act vs. individual act .128 (.031)
H7: Focal ﬁrm EMS  −.057 (.180)
Severity
H8: Degree of incident severity .138 (.001)
Structural paths (consequences)
H9: Responsibility attribution → anger .575 (.000) .508 (.000) .482 (.000) .519 (.000)
H10: Anger → boycotting .416 (.000) .339 (.000) .395 (.000) .738 (.000)
Responsibility attribution → boycotting .237 (.005) .113 (.229) .274 (.000) −.072 (.119)
Social  desirability → responsibility attribution −.003 (.973) .030(.632) −.048 (.581) −.063 (.172)
Social  desirability → anger .027 (.728) −.044 (.366) −.029 (.699) −.004 (.915)
Social  desirability → boycotting .171 (.084) .147 (.007) .158 (.051) −.057 (.099)
Environmental values → responsibility attribution .009 (.881) .217 (.002) .272 (.000) .214 (.000)
Environmental values → anger .003 (.953) .186 (.000) .143 (.006) .088 (.013)
Environmental values → boycotting −.032 (.559) .142 (.032) .056 (.303) .073 (.048)
Goodness of ﬁt
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) .063 .065 .065 .049
Conﬁrmatory ﬁt index (CFI) .960 .953 .954 .967
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) .947 .937 .938 .957
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otes: n(Klebﬁx) = 250; n(DressUp) = 284; n(FastCar) = 284; n(VisualLife) = 623. The structural e
Several of our hypotheses reﬂect the controllability dimension
f AT. We  did not ﬁnd support for H2, which suggested that focal
rms would be held more responsible for incidents happening on
heir own manufacturing sites, because the structural path was
ot signiﬁcant (SE = .007, p = .868). Similarly, the role of organi-
ational distance (H3) was not conﬁrmed (SE = −.027, p = .662), in
hat consumers did not differentiate unsustainable behavior by an
mmediate as opposed to an indirect supplier. These two  ﬁndings
ctually support our notion of chain liability, because the focal
rm appears to be held responsible for unsustainable incidents,
egardless of where they occur in the supply chain. Neither focal
rm size (H4, SE = .057, p = .333) nor the importance of the sup-
lied part for the end product (H5, SE = −.032, p = .591) signiﬁcantly
ffected responsibility attributions to the focal ﬁrm either. These
esults suggest that smaller ﬁrms are no less prone to responsi-
ility attributions than large ﬁrms, though in reality, smaller ﬁrms
ay  be less likely to be the targets of media reports, such that their
nsustainable supplier behavior may  go unnoticed. The ﬁndings
lso suggest that companies do not ﬁnd relief from chain liability if
nsustainable supplier behaviors refer to comparably unimportant
lements.
In support of H6 (SE = .128, p = .031), the focal ﬁrm received more
lame when the cause of the incident was the company rather than
n individual actor. In accordance with the stability dimension of
T, we predicted that focal ﬁrms with successful EMS  would be
ess susceptible to the chain liability effect, but H7 did not receive
upport (SE = −.057, p = .180). In terms of incident severity and con-
istent with H8, we found a signiﬁcant effect on responsibility
ttributions (SE = .138, p = .001); unsustainable supplier behavior
hat immediately and directly affected human health was  perceived
s more severe. However, consumers attributed less responsibility
f the consequences of the environmental pollution were long term,
ncertain, or blurry.
Finally, we predicted some consequences of these responsi-
ility attributions. Across all four structural equation models, we.073 .067 .047
n modeling used the MLM  estimator.
found signiﬁcant, strong effects of responsibility attributions on
feelings of anger (H9), with SE values between .482 (Fastcar) and
.575 (Klebﬁx). All paths from anger to boycotting behavior (H10)
were signiﬁcant, ranging between .339 (Dressup) and .738 (Visu-
allife). To substantiate our ﬁndings based on Likert scales, we  also
measured future buying behavior with a dichotomous scale. In the
selected experiments, approximately three-quarters of the partic-
ipants indicated that they would not buy a product from the focal
ﬁrm again. This result speciﬁes the risk associated with chain lia-
bility.
In all four models, we also included a direct path from respon-
sibility attribution to boycotting, to test whether anger mediates
the relationship between these constructs (Zhao et al., 2010) as
proposed by AT. In two of the four models, the direct effect was
signiﬁcant (Klebﬁx SE = .237, p = .005; Fastcar SE = .274, p = .000),
indicating partial mediation. This result suggests an extension to
AT, as we discuss subsequently. Fig. 2 provides a graphical summary
of the results from the four experiments.
The structural equation models also included paths from the
control variables for social desirability (Podsakoff et al., 2003) and
environmental values to responsibility attribution, anger and boy-
cotting. Social desirability did not affect the dependent variables
except for boycotting in the Dressup experiment. This means that
the inclusion of social desirability provided an effective control
from a potential contamination by social desirability. Environmen-
tal values affected responsibility attribution, anger and boycotting
behavior to some extent. In all except the force majeure manip-
ulation, respondents for whom the preservation of the natural
environment was  more important attributed more responsibility,
perceived more anger and reported more boycotting behavior. In
the force majeure case the path was understandably insigniﬁcant;
because from a consumer perspective, an act of nature appears
beyond the control of a company (Kalamas et al., 2014). When
a company was involved in causing the unsustainable incident
(all other manipulations) it is reasonable that people with more
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nvironmental values attributed more responsibility and felt more
nger, because they care more for the environment. Environmen-
al values also seemed to affect boycotting behaviors, which is not
 surprising ﬁnding; people who prioritize environmental issues
hould be more likely to take action against polluters. Marketing
iterature even warns that consumers who care about the natural
nvironment are more likely to boycott ﬁrms that disrespect their
oncerns (Chan et al., 2012; Friedman, 1985; Klein et al., 2004).
. Discussion and implications
.1. Discussion
Our ﬁndings support the existence of a chain liability effect in
ultitier supply chains: A focal ﬁrm may  be held responsible for
ot only its own but also its suppliers’ unsustainable behaviors.
lthough an incident resulting from force majeure decreases con-
umers’ responsibility attributions (H1), none of our hypotheses
elated to the controllability dimension of AT led to signiﬁcantly
ower responsibility attributions (H2–H5). Thus, we show that
hain liability persists, even if the unsustainable behavior or inci-
ent occurs outside the focal ﬁrm (H2), at an organizationally
istant supplier (H3), at a large or small ﬁrm (H4), or in relation
o more or less important supplied parts (H5). We  offer two possi-
le explanations for these ﬁndings. First, consumers might not fully
omprehend the difﬁculties of managing international, multitier
upply chains. To decrease chain liability, focal ﬁrms might consider
nforming consumers about the (limited) possibilities for establish-
ng transparency and control over complex chains. Alternatively,
he marketing literature suggests a more nuanced explanation:
ao et al. (2012) argue that consumers facing crises that affect
ultiple companies adopt habitual and convenient attitudes and
ehaviors, despite knowing that the problem requires far-reaching,
omplex solutions. The search for a “scapegoat” offers a simple, equation modelling.
convenient coping mechanism. Similarly, in the case of product
harm crises, negative spillover effects spread throughout the prod-
uct family (Roehm and Tybout, 2006), which might also apply
to “chain families.” Consumers might recognize the difﬁculties of
ensuring sustainable supplier behavior throughout the chain but
still ﬁnd it more convenient to blame a focal ﬁrm.
A third set of our hypotheses related to the stability of an
unsustainable incident. Although we predicted more stability per-
ceptions when the incident was  due to company behaviors (H6)
and no EMS  existed (H7), we found that consumers acknowledge
only that employee behavior can never be entirely regulated by
the employer, so they attribute less responsibility for an incident
caused by an employee. They do not really consider the ﬁrm’s
effort to develop an EMS. Perhaps companies that engage in sus-
tainable supply chain management create expectations that no
incidents will occur, because otherwise their activities represent
“greenwashing” (Kim and Lyon, 2011). Responsibility attributions
by consumers thus reﬂect factors over which a focal ﬁrm effectively
has little control or inﬂuence (New, 2004; Parmigiani et al., 2011).
These ﬁndings are critical; ultimately, consumer buying behav-
ior determines the harm to companies. The more the focal ﬁrm
is held responsible for unsustainable behavior in the supply
chain, the more likely consumers are to react with negative emo-
tions (H9) and behavior (H10). Thus, our ﬁndings lend empirical
support to Frooman’s (1999) stakeholder inﬂuence model. If a
stakeholder—the consumer in our study—lacks any opportunity to
inﬂuence an organization directly, it must apply an indirect inﬂu-
ence strategy. Thus a consumer might seek to inﬂuence the focal
ﬁrm, which has inﬂuence over the target unsustainable organi-
zation, to force it to act sustainably. If consumers withhold their
money from the focal ﬁrm, they may  be trying to force it to ensure
sustainability throughout its supply chain.
Another result also is worth discussing. Emotions do
not always mediate the relationship between responsibility
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ttributions and behavioral reactions, in contrast with the AT,
hich posits that responsibility attributions lead to negative
motions (anger), which then produce behavioral reactions
boycotting). However, in two of our four experiments (Table 5),
esponsibility attributions directly affected boycotting; emotions
ere full mediators for jeans (Dressup) and screens/displays
Visuallife) but complementary mediators for adhesives (Klebﬁx)
nd cars (Fastcar). This theoretically interesting result might imply
he substitutability or low importance of the latter two products.
f alternative products offer good substitutes (cars) or the product
s unimportant (adhesives), a consumer might boycott after an
nsustainable incident, without developing negative emotions.
ehavioral changes without preceding emotions are rational only
f the perceived effort of changing products or providers, due to a
oycott, is low.
.2. Theoretical implications
Research on sustainable supply chain management mostly
ocuses on the beneﬁts for focal ﬁrms, in terms of increased envi-
onmental, social, or economic performance (Bai and Sarkis, 2010;
arter and Jennings, 2004; Zhu and Sarkis, 2004). Far less attention
as addressed the valuation of a lack of sustainability (Auger et al.,
008, 2010), even though negative incidents have greater impacts
han positive ones (Sen and Battacharya, 2001). With this research,
e speciﬁcally address the consequences that arise for focal ﬁrms
s a result of unsustainable supplier behavior and demonstrate that
his domain deserves equal attention.
Research should acknowledge that the nature of such negative
ncidents varies in terms of locality and affected entity. In opera-
ions management research, negative incidents normally appear
nder the umbrella topic of product harm crises (Dawar and
illutla, 2000). Marucheck et al. (2011) argue that major product
efects often result from upstream actions in global production
hains. Furthermore, consumers do not boycott only when their
wn health and well-being is affected; they also do so because
anufacturing processes induce negative effects elsewhere. Thus,
ultitier supply chains must offer product traceability, product
ifecycle analysis, and recall management.
Operations management literature generally acknowledges
xternal stakeholder pressures as drivers of sustainability initia-
ives, directed toward the upstream value chain. We  enrich this
tream by providing more ﬁne-grained analyses of consumer per-
pectives on unsustainable incidents in supply chains. Focal ﬁrms
uffer exposures to the chain liability effect, even if an incident
akes place at the site of a distant, upstream supplier. Awaysheh
nd Klassen (2010) argue that as distance increases, ﬁrms face more
omplexity and transaction costs in their interactions with suppli-
rs, leading them to employ more monitoring and auditing systems
o mitigate information and transparency problems. We  note the
mportance of expanding such efforts beyond tier 1 suppliers, but
onitoring systems directed at risk mitigation constitute just a ﬁrst
tep in meeting high consumer expectations (Klassen and Vereecke,
012). A logical second step is enforcing changes in supplier behav-
or or improved supplier environmental performance. Only to the
xtent that monitoring leads to supplier behavior correction can it
rotect a focal ﬁrm from chain liability.
Finally, this research contributes to AT literature; we  extend
ts application to the interface between an individual consumer
nd a network of organizations in multitier supply chains. Attribu-
ion theory previously has been used mainly to explain the causal
nferences of a consumer about another person (e.g., Crossley,
009; Fragale et al., 2009) or organization (e.g., Taylor, 1994).
lthough derived logically from AT, our manipulations, particu-
arly those associated with the controllability dimension, were not
onﬁrmed. In an interorganizational context, the controllabilityns Management 32 (2014) 281–294 291
dimension appears too complex for individual consumers to real-
ize. In addition, AT suggests that emotional reactions fully mediate
the relationship between responsibility attributions and behav-
ioral reactions, but we ﬁnd several instances in which emotional
reactions only partially mediate this link. The direct path from
responsibility attributions to behavioral reactions therefore should
be considered and investigated in applications of this theory.
5.3. Managerial implications
In the case of an unsustainable incident in the supply chain, the
market will punish the focal ﬁrm for its suppliers’ behavior. Approx-
imately 75% of our respondents indicated they would not buy from
the focal ﬁrm after having learned about an unsustainable inci-
dent in its supply chain. Thus, we provide further evidence of the
important role that customers, as stakeholders, serve in determin-
ing the adoption of sustainable strategies (Hillman and Keim, 2001).
Managers must develop skills and capabilities to understand the
expectations of stakeholder groups, and customers in particular, for
sustainable behavior (Harrison et al., 2010). This recommendation
also suggests the importance of strengthening the organizational
link between supply chain management and marketing.
Beyond developing skills to understand the expectations of the
market, companies should work to ensure sustainable behavior
throughout the supply chain, to protect themselves from chain lia-
bility. We  recommend all companies, not just large ﬁrms, do so. We
also note that ﬁrms cannot focus only on their large, strategically
important, tier-1 suppliers; they must go beyond such predominant
approaches (Chatain, 2011; Surroca et al., 2010). Moreover, we reaf-
ﬁrm ﬁndings that suggest supply chain managers should develop
more profound capabilities for supplier development, collabora-
tion, and innovation (Gavronski et al., 2011; Klassen and Vereecke,
2012), then transfer those capabilities across tiers (Mena et al.,
2013). For example, IBM’s Social and Environmental Management
System, implemented among its approximately 30,000 tier 1 sup-
pliers, helps them enforce regulations among their suppliers, that
is, among the tier 2 suppliers of IBM.
If an incident occurs, well-developed communication strategies
must be in place to share information with consumers. However,
according to our ﬁndings, the only factors that can mitigate the
burden of being held accountable for unsustainable behavior by
suppliers is if the incident is due to force majeure, is less severe, or
arose because an employee acted independently, not in coherence
with company behaviors.
5.4. Limitations
The choices we made for this study imply certain limitations.
First, we  focused on environmental behaviors and incidents in
the supply chain, because environmental degradation more or less
directly and immediately affects human well-being. Our manip-
ulation of incident severity combined social and environmental
dimensions of sustainability though, which may  confound our
results. Second, the products varied substantially across the four
experimental vignettes (adhesives, clothing, cars, monitors), ran-
ging from utilitarian to hedonic, from simple to complex, and
from chemicals to high-tech products. These differences sug-
gest greater generalizability of our ﬁndings, but they also could
inﬂuence consumer perceptions of the supply chain. Third, our
single-country focus raises the question of whether consumers
from other countries react similarly when faced with unsustainable
behavior in a supply chain. German consumers have a reputation for
being very sensitive to environmental protection, so they may have
high expectations about supply chain sustainability. Fourth, the use
of vignettes only allowed us to assess consumers’ intended respon-
sibility attributions and emotional and behavioral reactions; we
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id not directly measure actual consumer reactions to real unsus-
ainable incidents. Consumers’ intended reactions often differ from
heir actual behaviors, as demonstrated in studies of consumer buy-
ng behavior for products with environmental features (Auger and
evinney, 2007).
. Conclusions and further research
The objective of this study has been to broaden our understand-
ng of whether and when consumers hold focal ﬁrms responsible
or the ecologically unsustainable behavior of their suppliers in
pstream supply chains, using both the predictors and outcomes
f such responsibility attributions. We  posited that eight factors
educed from four AT dimensions (i.e., locus of causality, con-
rollability, stability, and severity) would relate to responsibility
ttribution. However, our four vignette-based experiments reveal
hat only force majeure, a history of successful EMS  implementa-
ion, and incident severity signiﬁcantly affect the extent to which
onsumers hold the focal ﬁrm responsible for unsustainable behav-
or in the supply chain. No predictors related to controllability
ere signiﬁcant; consumers do not acknowledge restrictions on the
rm’s control within the supply chain. Higher responsibility attri-
utions relate to stronger feelings of anger and a higher propensity
o boycott, which highlights the economic risk to focal ﬁrms. Thus
his study establishes the chain liability effect: Consumers hold a
ocal ﬁrm responsible for behaviors and incidents upstream.
Additional research is warranted to determine how supply chain
anagers can effectively and efﬁciently extend their reach in theupply chain, to increase transparency, knowledge, and control.
esearchers could explore the implications of negative incidents
or the economic performance of the entire supply chain. Fur-
hermore, in contrast with AT, our mediation analysis indicated
Construct Questionnaire items
Responsibility attributiona Please indicate the extent to which you
(1  = agree not at all–7 = agree totally)
1. is responsible.
2. is careless.
3. is thoughtless.
Angerb Please put yourself into the place of the
statements relating to their emotions: (
1.  I as a customer of would be angry.
2.  I as a customer of would be enrage
3.  I as a customer of would be offend
Boycottingc Please put yourself into the place of the
statements relating to their reactions: (
1.  I as a customer would do something 
2.  I as a customer would do something 
3.  I as a customer would boycott .
4. I as a customer would not buy a fr
Manipulation checks 1. The primary cause for the incident w
2.  The situation described happened wi
3.  How many direct and indirect contra
4.  as a company is . (1 = very small
5.  Leather as part of the automobile in t
6.  The probability that a similar inciden
7.  The described incident is very severe
8. The described incident has primarily
tanning department.
Social desirabilityd Please evaluate to what extent you per
1.  I sometimes feel resentful when I do
2. I sometimes try to get even rather th
Environmental valuese Please evaluate to what extent the follo
1.  Unity with nature is very important f
a Struthers et al. (2005).
b Crossley (2009).
c Fragale et al. (2009); Struthers et al. (2005).
d Crowne and Marlowe (1960).
e Schwartz and Bilsky (1990).ns Management 32 (2014) 281–294
that consumers boycott some companies without ever feeling
negative emotions; risk management research thus should inves-
tigate closely which factors trigger an immediate punishment,
independent of negative emotions. We  also propose that mar-
keting researchers should determine whether the costs of efforts
to prevent unsustainable supplier behavior can be transferred to
the market. That is, does sustainable supply chain management
increase consumers’ willingness to pay? With regard to our ﬁnding
that consumers blame the focal ﬁrm, it would be interesting to dis-
cover if they fail to comprehend the focal ﬁrm’s limited control over
tier 2 and tier 3 suppliers, or if they don’t care and simply want to
punish the most accessible entity, namely, the focal ﬁrm. Finally, we
focused on environmental incidents, but it may  be equally interest-
ing to explore the antecedents and consequences of responsibility
attributions for negative social incidents. Further research thus
could investigate consumer perceptions and reactions to socially
unsustainable supplier behavior.
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire items.
 agree with the following statements about the previously described situation.
 customers of . Please evaluate to what extent you agree to following
1 = not at all likely–7 = very likely)
d.
ed.
 customers of . Please evaluate to what extent you agree to following
1 = not at all likely–7 = very likely)
to harm .
to make pay for it.
om next time. (yes/no)
as  ( ) force majeure or ( ) a failure of the company.
thin the company . (1 = not at all–7 = totally)
ctors are involved in the described situation? (2, 3, or 4)
–5 = very large)
he described situation is . (1 = not important at all–5 = very important)
t will happen again in future is very high. (1 = not at all–7 = totally)
. (1 = not at all–7 = totally)
 been caused by ( ) the company Luxury Leather or ( ) the individual head of the
sonally agree to following statements: (1 = not at all–7 = totally)
n’t get my  way.
an forgive and forget.
wing applies to you personally: (1 = applies not at all–7 = applies totally)
or me.
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